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PROMOTING PREDICTABILITY IN BUSINESS:





Multi-national corporations (“MNCs”) are increasingly subject to liabil-
ity in multiple jurisdictions for the same conduct. Overlapping liability is 
more than a hypothesized trend. As countries increasingly enforce their anti-
corruption legislation, “concurrent investigations and prosecutions by mul-
tiple countries . . . will become a fixture in the global anti-corruption en-
forcement landscape.”1 In fact, in light of recent duplicative prosecutions, 
overlapping liability has already begun to affect MNCs.
Perhaps the most flagrant example of these “carbon copy” prosecutions2
comes from charges against the TSKJ Consortium,3 which allegedly bribed 
Nigerian officials in exchange for liquefied natural gas contracts.4 The U.S. 
Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) and the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (the “SEC”) recovered more than $1.5 billion from the TSKJ Con-
sortium.5 At the same time, however, Nigeria brought charges against the 
consortium and several executives over conduct that “mirrored” the same 
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Oxford (2016); M.Sc., London School of Economics (2015). My sincere thanks to Professor 
Timothy Dickinson for his support, guidance, and continued friendship. Additional thanks to 
my fiancée, Jenna Pavelec, for her invaluable edits and support. Finally, thank you to my fam-
ily for helping me nurture my interest in international law and development.
1. For more background on the rise of duplicative prosecutions and additional exam-
ples, see Jay Holtmeier, Cross-Border Corruption Enforcement: A Case for Measured Coor-
dination Among Multiple Enforcement Authorities, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 493, 495 (2015).
2. Andrew S. Boutros & T. Markus Funk, “Carbon Copy” Prosecutions: A Growing 
Anticorruption Phenomenon in a Shrinking World, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 259, 260 (2012).
3. The TSKJ Consortium was a joint venture that consisted of four companies: Kel-
logg, Brown, & Root (a Halliburton subsidiary), Eni-Snamprogetti Netherlands BV, JGC 
Corporation, and Technip, S.A. Richard L. Cassin, JGC Confirms DOJ Investigation, THE 
FCPA BLOG (July 12, 2010, 8:02 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2010/7/12/jgc-
confirms-doj-investigation.html.
4. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges KBR and Halliburton for 
FCPA Violations (Feb. 11, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-23.htm.
5. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, JGC Corporation Resolves Foreign Corrupt 
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allegations the company and its executives resolved in the United States.6
The companies were forced to settle with the Nigerian government.7 In ad-
dition to enforcement actions in the United States and Nigeria, the consorti-
um also faced $22.7 million in penalties from the African Development 
Bank,8 a £7 million disgorgement in the United Kingdom,9 and a € 24.5 mil-
lion disgorgement in Italy.10
These sovereigns’ decisions to subject the TSKJ Consortium to multiple 
and duplicative prosecutions for the same underlying conduct illustrates an 
evolving dilemma in international anti-corruption enforcement.11 As coun-
tries’ willingness and interest to enforce anti-corruption legislation increase, 
MNCs may find themselves subject to overlapping liability and multi-
jurisdictional penalties.12 With no clear mechanism for determining where 
and to what extent an MNC might be liable, MNCs face an environment of 
legal uncertainty.
Corruption negatively impacts economies by distorting markets and in-
hibiting development.13 Indeed, corruption and bribery impinge upon the 
“overall governance environment and the efficiency of the state apparatus, 
erode the ability of the government to collect revenues from formal tax 
channels, and ultimately undermine sustainable economic development and 
the rule of law.”14 But the TSKJ Consortium dilemma demonstrates a poten-
6. Boutros & Funk, supra note 2, at 259–60.
7. Id.
8. Press Release, African Dev. Bank Grp., AfDB Charges Snamprogetti Netherlands 
B.V. US $5.7 million in Monetary Sanction for Corrupt Practices (May 28, 2014), 
http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/afdb-charges-snamprogetti-netherlands-b-v-
us-5-7-million-in-monetary-sanction-for-corrupt-practices-13233.
9. MW Kellogg, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Kellogg, Brown & Root, was required 
to pay £7 million. Press Release, UK Serious Fraud Office, MW Kellogg Ltd to Pay £7 Mil-
lion in SFO High Court Action (Feb. 16, 2011), https://www.foley.com/files/
FCPA23feb11SFOKelloggRelease.pdf.
10. Liam Moloney, Milan Court Finds Saipem Guilty of Nigeria Corruption,
WALL STREET J. (July 11, 2013, 3:32 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887324425204578599990427813164.
11. See Elizabeth K. Spahn, Multijurisdictional Bribery Law Enforcement: The OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 30 (2012).
12. See Meg Beasley, Dysfunctional Equivalence: Why the OECD Anti-Bribery Con-
vention Provides Insufficient Guidance in the Era of Multinational Corporations, 47 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 191, 193 (2015).
13. Leah M. Trzcinski, The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on Emerging 
Markets: Company Decision-Making in a Regulated World, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
1201, 1280 (2013); Combating Corruption, WORLD BANK (Oct. 4, 2018),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption.
14. Marie Chêne, Evidence of the Impact of Facilitation Payments, TRANSPARENCY 
INT’L (July 1, 2013), www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/The_impact_of_
facilitation_payments.pdf; see also Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Causes and Consequences of 
Corruption: What Do We Know from a Cross-Section of Countries?, in INTERNATIONAL 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION 3, 23–25 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 
2006).
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tial consequence of overlapping liability: MNCs may be disincentivized 
from voluntarily self-disclosing and cooperating with authorities because 
working with officials in one country might very well expose the company 
to liability in another.15 Worse, the uncertainty imposed on MNCs from re-
dundant prosecutions may deter MNCs and individuals from reaching a set-
tlement agreement or admitting their culpability for fear of being estopped 
from taking a different position in another jurisdiction, which may very well 
have different legal standards for the conduct in question.16 Simply, large 
criminal and civil penalties actually may “dissuade corporations from inves-
tigating purported misconduct and reporting detected crimes.”17 The incen-
tive not to cooperate with authorities is heightened at the international level. 
After a guilty plea in one jurisdiction, MNCs may face duplicative prosecu-
tions from other countries as governments seek “political credit for anti-
corruption efforts, revenge against opposition groups, or revenues for de-
pleted national treasuries from large fines and penalties.”18
Nothing in existing international frameworks guards against corporate 
double jeopardy, so any country with a jurisdictional hook can pile on pen-
alties for a single offense. Moreover, countries have not been receptive to 
attempts to cry double jeopardy. In July 2015, the Federal Chamber of 
Criminal Cassation of Argentina (Cámara Federal de Casación Penal) al-
lowed the prosecution of a defendant for bribing Argentine officials despite 
his defense that he was already prosecuted in Germany for the same con-
duct.19 More recently, in March 2018, the French Supreme Court (Cour de 
Cassation) explicitly rejected a company’s invocation of double jeopardy as 
a defense.20 The French and Argentine courts’ decisions to reject double 
jeopardy as a defense, coupled with the redundant prosecutions in the TSKJ 
Consortium example, demonstrate why MNCs or individuals have little in-
centive to cooperate with investigators in a different jurisdiction. Overzeal-
15. See Robert W. Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, A Proposal for a United States Depart-
ment of Justice Foreign Corrupt Practices Leniency Policy, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 153 passim
(2010).
16. See Drury D. Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, FCPA Sanctions: Too Big To De-
bar?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 819 (2011).
17. Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 15, at 154.
18. Spahn, supra note 11, at 30; see also CNN Wire Staff, Halliburton Settles Nigeria 
Bribery Claims for $35 Million, CNN (Dec. 21, 2010, 8:46 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/12/21/nigeria.halliburton/index.html (“Many ob-
servers in Nigeria regarded the charges as a publicity stunt by the financial crimes commission 
ahead of national elections in April and as a symbolic effort to display resolve against gov-
ernment corruption.”).
19. Holtmeier, supra note 1, at 515. 
20. Stéphane Bonifassi, French Supreme Court Finds No Double Jeopardy Based On
Foreign Plea Agreement, FCPA BLOG (Apr. 5, 2018, 8:22 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/
blog/2018/4/5/stephane-bonifassi-french-supreme-court-finds-no-double-jeop.html (describ-
ing the court’s holding that Vitol, the Swiss oil trader involved in bribes related to the United 
Nations’ Oil-for-Food program in Iraq, could not invoke double jeopardy as a defense after 
pleading guilty in a New York court in 2017 and paying $17 million in fines and penalties).
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ous and overlapping prosecution has rendered international anti-corruption 
enforcement “uneven, underdeveloped, and unpredictable.”21
This Note evaluates solutions to the problems of overlapping liability in 
general and multi-jurisdictional disgorgement in particular.22 Part I traces 
the origins of international anti-corruption efforts and provides an overview 
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the “FCPA”).23 It then discusses the 
two most significant international anti-corruption conventions: the OECD’s 
Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Officials in International 
Business Transactions (the “OECD Convention”)24 and the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption (“UNCAC”).25 Part II lays out the problems 
created by the lack of a formal mechanism to prevent overlapping liabil-
ity—a phenomenon that violates the common law concept known as double 
jeopardy26 and the analogous civil law principle ne bis in idem (not twice in 
the same thing).27 Part III proposes a formal mechanism to militate against 
the problems noted in Part II and argues that these provisions should be 
housed in a series of bilateral agreements akin to those that exist in interna-
tional antitrust enforcement. Ultimately, this Note stresses the need for a 
more proportional and predictable method of ensuring that MNCs are not 
subject to overlapping liability and provides an actionable means for doing 
so.
I.  The Global Fight Against Corruption
The FCPA was the first major piece of international anti-corruption leg-
islation.28 Since its passage in 1977, the number and scope of anti-corruption 
legislation around the globe increased rapidly.29 Section I.A highlights the 
history of the FCPA, its influence on the global anti-corruption battle, and 
21. Spahn, supra note 11, at 6.
22. See discussion infra Section II.B.
23. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd, 78ff (2012).
24. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-43 [hereinafter OECD 
Convention].
25. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, opened for signature Dec. 9, 2003, 
S. Treaty Doc. No. 109-6, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41 [hereinafter UNCAC].
26. Double Jeopardy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining double 
jeopardy as “[t]he fact of being prosecuted or sentenced twice for substantially the same of-
fense.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. (stating that “[N]or shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”).
27. See John A.E. Vervaele, The Transnational Ne Bis In Idem Principle in the EU 
Mutual Recognition and Equivalent Protection of Human Rights, 1 UTRECHT L. REV. 100, 
102 (2005).
28. Brian C. Harms, Holding Public Officials Accountable in the International Realm: 
A New Multi-Layered Strategy to Combat Corruption, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 159, 170–71
(2000).
29. See discussion infra Section I.B.
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the penalties and jurisdictional scope of the DOJ and SEC. Section I.B dis-
cusses the far-reaching jurisdictional mandates of the OECD Convention 
and UNCAC.
A. The FCPA: Catalyzing the 
Modern Anti-Corruption Movement
In early 1974, special prosecutors and the Watergate Committee30 un-
covered evidence of illegal campaign contributions, money laundering 
through foreign countries, and the use of campaign funds to secure govern-
ment contracts.31 Over the next several years, the SEC identified over $300 
million in foreign bribery by more than 400 U.S. corporations.32 With gov-
ernment officials implicated from countries across the world, it became ap-
parent that corruption was a global problem.33 Although the Organization of 
American States adopted a resolution condemning “any act of bribery” in 
1975,34 and the United Nations General Assembly denounced corrupt prac-
tices writ large,35 neither resolution included enforcement or monitoring 
provisions.36 But in 1977, the United States amended the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act to include the FCPA,37 thus becoming the first country to 
criminalize the bribery of foreign officials.38
In its current incarnation, the FCPA relies on two primary approaches to 
combat international corruption. First, it criminalizes bribing foreign offi-
cials,39 stating that it is illegal to make “an offer, payment, promise to pay, 
or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to 
give, or authorization giving anything of value . . . for the purposes of secur-
30. Establishment of Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, S. Res. 
60, 93d Cong. (1973).
31. Peter W. Schroth, The United States and the International Bribery Conventions, 50 
AM. J. COMP. L. 593, 595 (2002).
32. Id. 
33. Id. (noting that the uncovered evidence implicated governmental officials from 
countries as diverse as Japan, Ghana, Iran, Mexico, the Philippines, Venezuela, and Italy).
34. Org. of American States, OAS Res. CP/RES. 154 (167/75), Behavior of Transna-
tional Enterprises Operating in the Region and Need for a Code of Conduct to Be Observed 
by Such Enterprises, in 14 I.L.M. 1326 (1975).
35. G.A. Res. 3514, Measures Against Corrupt Practices of Transnational and Other 
Corporations, Their Intermediaries and Others Involved (Dec. 15, 1975).
36. Schroth, supra note 31, at 596.
37. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd, 78ff (2012). 
38. Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 
929, 930 (2012) (“In the mid-1970s, Congress journeyed into unchartered territory. After 
more than two years of investigations, deliberation and consideration, what emerged in 1977 
was the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).”).
39. For a discussion of the ambiguity in the statutory definitions within the FCPA, see 
Matthew W. Muma, Toward Greater Guidance: Reforming the Definitions of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1356 (2014).
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ing any improper advantage.”40 This provision applies to issuers,41 U.S. do-
mestic concerns,42 and individuals and companies who act “with a territorial 
nexus to the United States.”43 Second, the FCPA contains accounting provi-
sions. These provisions impose a record-keeping requirement that obliges 
companies to maintain accurate books and records as well as to implement a 
“system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable as-
surances” for compliance with accounting regulations.44 Violations of these 
provisions are jointly prosecuted by the DOJ and the SEC, with the former 
primarily investigating criminal violations and the latter focusing its efforts 
on civil violations.45
Punishment for violating the FCPA can be severe. In addition to puni-
tive fines of millions of dollars,46 the DOJ may impose criminal penalties on 
individuals of up to twenty years’ imprisonment for violations of the ac-
counting provisions47 and up to five years for violations of the anti-bribery 
provisions.48 Moreover, the DOJ can subject corporations to monitors49 and 
force them to implement or improve compliance programs in exchange for 
deferred prosecution agreements (“DPAs”) and non-prosecution agreements 
(“NPAs”).50 The SEC, too, wields significant discretion in imposing civil 
penalties, typically consisting of fines and injunctions.51 Since 2004, when 
ABB Ltd. disgorged $5.9 million for illicit profits procured in connection 
with bribes in Angola, Nigeria, and Kazakhstan,52 the SEC has increasingly 
sought disgorgement of ill-gotten gains.53 While disgorgement is typically 
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1. An “issuer” is a company with a security registered on a na-
tional securities exchange. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8) (2012). 
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2. Domestic concerns include U.S. citizens, legal residents, all 
U.S. corporations, and their agents and employees (regardless of nationality). See Rachel 
Brewster, Enforcing the FCPA: International Resonance and Domestic Strategy, 103 VA. L.
REV. 1611, 1627 (2017). 
43. Brewster, supra note 42, at 1627; see 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
45. See STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS 82–83 (2d ed. 2010).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
47. Id.
48. Id. §§ 78dd-2(g), 78dd-3(e), 78ff(c)(2).
49. Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New 
Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1742 (2007).
50. Mary Miller, More Than Just a Potted Plant: A Court’s Authority To Review De-
ferred Prosecution Agreements Under the Speedy Trial Act and Under Its Inherent Superviso-
ry Power, 115 MICH. L. REV. 135, 136 (2016); Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforce-
ment, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 933 (2010).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d) (2012).
52. Litigation Release No. 2049, SEC Sues ABB Ltd. in Foreign Bribery Case (July 6, 
2004), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18775.htm.
53. See Koehler, supra note 50, at 982.
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the purview of the SEC, the DOJ has occasionally sought disgorgement, 
such as its 2017 enforcement action against Biomet after the company vio-
lated its DPA.54
The FCPA not only allows for severe penalties—its reach is expan-
sive.55 The FCPA allows the U.S. government to assert jurisdiction over 
corporations with only a modicum of a connection to the United States.56
For instance, a phone call routed through the United States or a single email 
could provide sufficient jurisdictional grounds.57 The potential for a small, 
even unintentional connection, to subject a corporation to another country’s 
jurisdiction is all the more troubling in the digital age, when electronic 
communications and data are often housed in servers abroad.58 And when it 
comes to monitoring corruption, government agencies are no longer the on-
ly watchdogs. For example, in 2016, an anonymous civilian source leaked 
the “Panama Papers,” which resulted in a worldwide press release of the 
news.59 In a digitally connected world, the potential to identify and dissemi-
nate information about corruption is greater than ever.60 As a result, interna-
tional regulatory anti-corruption efforts are only accelerating.61 This height-
ened focus on enforcement—both at home and abroad—opens up the 
possibility of “carbon copy” prosecutions and redundant penalties across 
multiple jurisdictions.62
54. See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA DIGEST: RECENT TRENDS AND 
PATTERNS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 4, 13 (2018), 
https://www.shearman.com/-/media/Files/Perspectives/2018/01/January-2018-FCPA-Digest-
Recent-Trends.pdf.
55. See Muma, supra note 39, at 1338 (noting that the FCPA is broad and the limita-
tions to that reach are uncertain); Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical 
Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 283–84 (1997).
56. Lucinda A. Low & Timothy P. Trenkle, U.S. Anti-Bribery Law Goes Global: 
Standards Tightening Up, BUS. L. TODAY, July–Aug. 1999, at 14.
57. Id.
58. Cf. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (per curiam) (declin-
ing to consider whether a U.S. provider of email services must disclose digital information 
housed abroad after Congress passed the CLOUD Act).
59. See FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, ANTI-BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION:
GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 2017, at 4 (2017), 
https://www.freshfields.com/globalassets/services-page/global-investigations/publication-
pdfs/gi-abc-guide-2017.pdf.
60. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Following the Money: Lessons from the Panama Pa-
pers, 121 PA. ST. L. REV. 807, 862 (2017).
61. See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, supra note 54, at 2; See Koehler, supra note 50,
at 981.
62. Boutros & Funk, supra note 2, at 260.
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B. International Anti-Corruption Efforts: The 
OECD Convention and UNCAC
In 1988, Congress amended the FCPA63 and encouraged the OECD to 
pass legislation that would help combat bribery.64 In the wake of these re-
newed anti-corruption efforts, the OECD created the Ad Hoc Group on Illic-
it Payments.65 Soon, what began as a trickle of international interest in com-
batting corruption became a cascade as the world passed regional and global 
anti-corruption conventions.66 This Note focuses on the global anti-
corruption conventions due to their potential jurisdictional reach in interna-
tional anti-corruption enforcement. First, the OECD passed the Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Trans-
actions (the “OECD Convention”) in 1997.67 Second, the United Nations 
passed the Convention Against Corruption (“UNCAC”) in 2003.68
Broadly speaking, the OECD Convention and UNCAC are similar in 
that they implore countries to implement anti-corruption legislation at the 
national level.69 In the years following passage of the OECD Convention 
and UNCAC, countries have passed major anti-bribery legislation, most no-
tably the United Kingdom.70 The OECD Convention’s text is comparable to 
63. See Omnibus Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, sec. 5003, 102 
Stat. 1107, 1416–1417 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–3, 78ff (2012)).
64. OECD WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE OECD WORKING 
GROUP ON BRIBERY 2014 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGB-AB-AnnRep-
2014-EN.pdf.
65. Id.
66. The impact of regional anti-corruption conventions has largely been neglected by 
the legal academy. Although beyond the scope of this Note, future research might address 
how regional conventions have affected overlapping liability. Such regional conventions in-
clude (1) the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, S. TREATY DOC.
No. 105-39; (2) the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, E.T.S. No. 173; 
(3) the European Union Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of 
the European Community or Officials of Member States, May 26, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 12; and (4) 
the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combatting Corruption, July 11, 2003, 43 
I.L.M. 5, https://au.int/en/treaties/african-union-convention-preventing-and-combating-
corruption.
67. OECD Convention, supra note 24.
68. See UNCAC, supra note 25.
69. Compare, OECD Convention, supra note 24, art. 12 (“The Parties shall co-operate 
in carrying out a programme of systematic follow-up to monitor and promote the full imple-
mentation of this Convention.”), with UNCAC, supra note 25, art. 65 (“Each State Party shall 
take the necessary measures, including legislative and administrative measures, in accordance 
with fundamental principles of its domestic law, to ensure the implementation of its obliga-
tions under this Convention.”).
70. See Jessica A. Lordi, The U.K. Bribery Act: Endless Jurisdictional Liability on 
Corporate Violators, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 955, 964 (2012).
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the FCPA in both its anti-bribery71 and accounting provisions.72 It also en-
courages countries to adopt criminal and civil penalties for bribery.73 For 
example, it asks countries to “take such measures as may be necessary to 
provide that the bribe and the proceeds of the bribery . . . or property the 
value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds, are subject to seizure 
and confiscation . . . .”74 UNCAC is more thorough in its detailing of ac-
ceptable punishment guidelines for countries. It beseeches them to “the 
greatest extent possible . . . to enable confiscation” of “[p]roceeds of 
crime”75 and “property, equipment or other instrumentalities used in or des-
tined for use in offenses . . . .”76
Both conventions embrace a far-reaching definition of jurisdiction. Un-
der the OECD Convention, so long as the offense is committed in part of its 
territory, a country “shall take such measures as may be necessary to estab-
lish its jurisdiction . . . .”77 Not only does the OECD Convention compel 
countries to exercise jurisdiction, it encourages them to construe their juris-
diction “broadly so that an extensive physical connection to the bribery act 
is not required.”78 UNCAC contains similar language and level of jurisdic-
tional empowerment. It provides that each country “shall adopt such 
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses 
in accordance with this Convention . . . .”79
While the broad jurisdictional mandates found in the OECD Conven-
tion and UNCAC theoretically make it easier for countries to prosecute and 
combat corruption, the mandates also expose MNCs to overlapping liability 
given that international business transactions, by definition, include more 
than one country. Substantial international participation in the OECD Con-
vention and UNCAC augment these overlapping liability concerns. To date, 
forty-four countries (thirty-six OECD countries and eight non-OECD coun-
tries) have signed the OECD Convention,80 and 186 countries are parties to 
71. Compare OECD Convention, supra note 24, art. 1 (establishing that it is unlawful 
to “offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, . . . to a foreign public of-
ficial”), with 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2012) (proscribing the bribery of any foreign official).
72. Compare OECD Convention, supra note 24, art. 8 (requiring “the maintenance of 
books and records, financial statement disclosures, and accounting and auditing standards” to 
prevent bribery or the hiding of bribery), with 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)–(B) (2012) (mandat-
ing issuers to “make and keep books, records, and accounts,” in addition to “maintain[ing] a 
system of internal accounting controls” to prevent bribery).
73. OECD Convention, supra note 24, art. 3, ¶¶ 1–3. 
74. Id. art. 3, ¶ 3.
75. UNCAC, supra note 25, art. 31, ¶ 1(a).
76. Id. art. 31, ¶ 1(b).
77. OECD Convention, supra note 24, art. 4, ¶ 1.
78. Id. cmt. n.25.
79. UNCAC, supra note 25, art. 42, ¶ 1.
80. OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibribery
convention.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).
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UNCAC.81 As a result, it is important to determine the effects this extensive 
jurisdictional reach—and concomitant liability risk—have on the interna-
tional business environment.
II.  The Problems with Overlapping Liability
The FCPA, OECD Convention, and UNCAC leave corporations vul-
nerable to multiple prosecutions and multiple sanctions for a single instance 
of unlawful activity. Section II.A details the rise in enforcement efforts and 
the lack of a formal mechanism to resolve issues of overlapping liability. 
Section II.B describes the use of disgorgement as a remedy in anti-
corruption enforcement and explains why overlapping liability proves par-
ticularly problematic in the disgorgement context. Finally, Section II.C 
identifies the theoretical and practical problems of overlapping liability and 
its potential to undermine international development.
A. Negative Externalities of Overlapping Liability
As countries are increasingly interested in anti-corruption enforcement, 
overlapping liability will become an increasingly significant problem. In-
deed, the coming years “may see more investigations commencing locally 
that lead to enforcement action in several jurisdictions.”82 A global interest 
in combating corruption might not present a problem if the international an-
ti-corruption regime had formal mechanisms to militate against overlapping 
liability. As it stands, however, international anti-corruption enforcement 
only addresses overlapping liability “in a limited way, if at all.”83 Indeed, 
the OECD Convention’s only acknowledgement of overlapping liability is 
to promote cross-country consultation with “a view to determining the most 
appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution.”84 UNCAC simply encourages 
countries to consult “with a view to coordinating their actions.”85 Even if 
countries are able to successfully coordinate their enforcement actions, 
MNCs will still find themselves liable in more than one jurisdiction.
Given the broad jurisdictional powers granted to countries via the 
FCPA, the OECD, and UNCAC—and the concomitant lack of a formal 
mechanism to resolve cases where more than one sovereign has jurisdic-
81. See United Nations Convention Against Corruption: Signature and Ratification 
Status, UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/
en/corruption/ratification-status.html (last updated June 26, 2018).
82. FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP, supra note 59, at 4.
83. INT’L BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL 
JURISDICTION 229 (2009), https://documents.law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/Task%20Force
%20on%20Extraterritorial%20Jurisdiction%20-%20Report%20.pdf [hereinafter REPORT OF 
THE TASK FORCE].
84. OECD Convention, supra note 24, art. 4, ¶ 3.
85. UNCAC, supra note 25, art. 42, ¶ 5.
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tion—the risk of overlapping liability is “substantial.”86 This is problematic 
under the common law principle known as double jeopardy87 and the analo-
gous civil law principle ne bis in idem (not twice in the same thing).88 Even 
though the United States has not yet adopted a doctrine of international 
double jeopardy,89 the concern is not just juridical in nature: it is also related 
to the practical effect redundant prosecutions have on MNCs.
Redundant prosecutions, or “carbon copy” prosecutions, refer to “suc-
cessive, duplicative prosecutions by multiple sovereigns for conduct trans-
gressing the laws of several nations, but arising out of the same common 
nucleus of operative facts.”90 The concern is not only that MNCs might face 
redundant and costly investigations but also that the risk of successive pros-
ecution breeds uncertainty in the international business environment.91 This 
uncertainty undermines MNCs’ good-faith attempts to comply with regula-
tions,92 which is compounded by the lack of guidance on specific actions 
that would give rise to liability.93 Ultimately, the lack of predictability with 
respect to anti-corruption enforcement creates a “perverse circular pattern” 
in which businesses cannot predict the extent of their liability even if they 
invest in compliance programs.94 And with internal investigations costing up 
to $20 million,95 MNCs have little incentive to work toward compliance or 
voluntarily disclose suspected violations because these steps present MNCs 
with a substantial risk of liability in multiple jurisdictions.96 Overlapping li-
86. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Treaty Double Jeopardy: The OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention and the FCPA, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1321, 1326–29 (2012).
87. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
88. Vervaele, supra note 27, at 100.
89. United States v. Jeong, 624 F.3d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. 
Martin, 574 F.2d 1359, 1360 (5th Cir. 1978)).
90. Boutros & Funk, supra note 2, at 269.
91. See David C. Weiss, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of 
Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribu-
tion, and Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 503–05 (2009); cf. George Bittlingmayer, 
Regulatory Uncertainty and Investment: Evidence from Antitrust Enforcement, 20 CATO J.
295, 321–22 (2001) (noting that regulatory uncertainty in antitrust has led to underinvest-
ment).
92. See Mike Koehler, Grading the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Guidance, 7 WHITE 
COLLAR CRIME REP. 961, 963 (2012).
93. See Irina Sivachenko, Corporate Victims of “Victimless Crime”: How the FCPA’s
Statutory Ambiguity, Coupled with Strict Liability, Hurts Businesses and Discourages Com-
pliance, 54 B.C. L. REV. 393, 405–06, 410 (2013) (stating that the DOJ’s Resource Guide 
lacks specificity with what constitutes a bribe, making it difficult for businesses to comply).
94. Id. at 415.
95. Daniel J. Grimm, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Merger and Acquisition 
Transactions: Successor Liability and Its Consequences, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 247, 278 
(2010).
96. See Sivachenko, supra note 93, at 415 (noting that corporations have little incentive 
to invest in compliance programs because there is no guarantee that enforcement authorities 
will take these good faith actions into account).
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ability thus provides perverse incentives for companies and individuals by 
over-deterring positive behavior—such as undertaking internal investiga-
tions97 or choosing to voluntarily self-disclose identified wrongdoing98—for 
fear of it being used against them in multiple enforcement actions.
Uncertainty with respect to an MNC’s potential liability also has a 
chilling effect on international investment as a whole.99 Corruption is partic-
ularly endemic in emerging economies,100 which means that MNCs seeking 
to invest in these countries must navigate liability “minefields” to do so.101
The “inherent unpredictability of human and government conduct” makes it 
even more difficult for MNCs to internalize their liability risks in these ju-
risdictions.102 Given these risks, MNCs may be more reluctant to invest in 
emerging economies.103 These countries are in the greatest need of foreign 
capital.104 With less investment, however, they face relatively lower rates of
economic growth105 and difficulties improving living standards.106 Enhanced 
97. See Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 15, at 212 (claiming that corporations are less 
likely to undertake an internal investigation if potential discovery of identified wrongdoing 
would lead to enforcement). 
98. Id. at 206–07 (noting that, all else being equal, a larger sanction “may create a dis-
incentive for corporations to report voluntarily detected FCPA violations”); Stevenson & 
Wagoner, supra note 16, at 819. 
99. See The Committee on Foreign Investment: One Year After Dubai Ports World, 
Hearing Before H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of David Mar-
chick, Partner, Covington & Burling LLP) (explaining that “uncertainty can chill invest-
ment”); Margaret Ryznar & Samer Korkor, Anti-Bribery Legislation in the United States and 
United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis of Scope and Sentencing, 76 MO. L. REV. 415, 418 
(2011) (suggesting that FCPA enforcements counterproductively chill investments in certain 
markets); Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legisla-
tion as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351, 371–72 (2010) 
(noting that corporate liability under the FCPA correlates with a decline in U.S. business ac-
tivity).
100. Philip M. Nichols, Corruption as an Assurance Problem, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
1307, 1309 (2004).
101. Peter G. Strasser, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Through the Lens of Azerbai-
jan and the Republic of Georgia, 61 LA. B.J. 260, 261 (2014).
102. See JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
25 (2013) (“An investor may promise to build a factory in a country but never build it. A host 
government may enact a low corporate tax rate in one year with a promise never to raise it, yet 
pass legislation to increase taxes drastically the day after an investor makes an investment.”).
103. See Spalding, supra note 99, at 371–73; see also Andrew T. Bulovsky, Promises 
Unfulfilled: How Investment Arbitration Tribunals Mishandle Corruption Claims and Under-
mine International Development, 118 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (arguing that com-
panies are responsive to the risks of international investment and may choose to forgo invest-
ment altogether if the risks are too high).
104. Spalding, supra note 99, at 371, 403; Weiss, supra note 91, at 502 (noting that in-
ternational investment would help emerging countries by way of infrastructure projects).
105. Combating Corruption, supra note 13 (“Corruption impedes investment, with con-
sequent effects on growth and jobs.”).
106. See Jonathan Bonnitcha, Foreign Investment, Development and Governance, 7 J.
INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 31, 33 (2016); C. Raj Kumar, Corruption, Development and Good 
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liability risks thus contribute to an uncertain investment environment for 
MNCs, which has a particularly pernicious effect on developing countries.
B. Disgorgement in International Anti-Corruption Efforts
Disgorgement is a readily available remedy for countries across the 
world seeking to enforce anti-corruption legislation.107 The purpose of dis-
gorgement is to deprive a wrongdoer of its unjust enrichment.108 Unlike 
fines or injunctive measures, disgorgement is not intended to punish, only to 
prevent the violator from reaping ill-gotten gains.109 In other words, dis-
gorgement is not intended to compensate a wronged party but is instead 
meant to recoup the benefits of the wrongful act in the first place.110 Accord-
ingly, U.S. courts have held that disgorgement may not exceed the profits a 
company realizes as a result of its allegedly unlawful activity.111 Indeed, af-
ter ill-gotten gains have been disgorged, further disgorgement for the same 
conduct would be “clearly punitive in its effect.”112 Confining the use of 
disgorgement to its proper purpose is important because regulators have 
other measures that they can turn to if punitive relief is appropriate.
On the international stage, subjecting MNCs to overlapping liability 
risks expanding disgorgement beyond its traditional usage and purpose.113
The FCPA, the OECD Convention, and UNCAC all rely on disgorgement 
as a remedy.114 So, in the face of enforcement risks from more than one 
country, MNCs may be subjected to disgorgement in multiple jurisdic-
tions.115 Significantly, in addition to disgorgement risks from multiple juris-
Governance: Challenges for Promoting Access to Justice in Asia, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L.
475, 543 (2008).
107. See infra nn. 119–124 and accompanying text.
108. SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. 
Tome, 833 F.2d 1086, 1096 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the purpose of “disgorgement is to 
make sure that wrongdoers [may] not profit from their wrongdoing.”); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 
F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965) (stating that “it is simple equity that a wrongdoer should dis-
gorge his fraudulent enrichment”).
109. See Elizabeth S. Stong, Basics of the SEC’s Disgorgement Remedy, 43 PRAC.
LAW., Apr. 1997, at 67, 68–69.
110. Weiss, supra note 91, at 485.
111. See SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that a “court’s
power to order disgorgement extends only to the amount with interest by which the defendant 
profited from his wrongdoing”). 
112. Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, 734 F. Supp. 1071, 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990), rev’d, 967 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1992).
113. See Sasha Kalb & Marc Alain Bohn, Disgorgement: The Devil You Don’t Know,
CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Apr. 12, 2010), https://www.corporatecompliance
insights.com/disgorgement-fcpa-how-applied-calculated (noting that disgorgement is not 
meant to be punitive and that any disgorgement beyond the calculable amount earned due to 
illicit activity would constitute punishment).
114. See Weiss, supra note 91, at 499.
115. Id. at 492.
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dictions, MNCs may be liable for sanctions from multilateral development 
banks (“MDBs”).116 Indeed, if an MNC engages in misconduct connected to 
a World Bank (or another MDB) contract, it may be subject to other sanc-
tions from the Bank as well.117 These concerns are all the more salient as 
regulators increasingly turn to disgorgement as a remedy.118
Disgorgement has long existed in the SEC’s enforcement arsenal119 but 
has only been employed in the anti-corruption context since 2004.120 Despite 
statutory authorization to disgorge ill-gotten gains from the Penny Stock Re-
form Act, the SEC did not pursue disgorgement in the FCPA context until 
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) in 2002.121 After the Enron 
scandal,122 the U.S. Congress passed SOX, focusing more government atten-
tion on addressing suspicious corporate behavior.123 Since the early 2000s, 
the SEC has increasingly used disgorgement in its enforcement actions.124
Additionally, as discussed above,125 both the OECD Convention and 
UNCAC encourage signatories to enact domestic legislation that enables 
seizure or confiscation of ill-gotten gains.126 A review of countries’ imple-
menting laws reveals that the majority provide for confiscation or forfeiture 
116. See The World Bank Group’s Sanctions Regime: Information Note, WORLD BANK, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/The_World_Bank_Group_
Sanctions_Regime.pdf.
117. See Timothy Dickinson et al., Implications of the World Bank Sanctions Regime for 
International Business, PAUL HASTINGS (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.paulhastings.com/
publications-items/details/?id=1213e369-2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbded (noting the risk of 
debarment for companies).
118. See Koehler, supra note 50, at 981.
119. See Weiss, supra note 91, at 485.
120. Id. at 486.
121. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); see
Weiss, supra note 91, at 486 (discussing the extent of SOX’s influence on FCPA enforce-
ment).
122. Troy Segal, Enron Scandal: The Fall of a Wall Street Darling, INVESTOPEDIA
(Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/updates/enron-scandal-summary (last updated 
Feb. 9, 2019) (detailing the history of Enron and how the company’s dubious accounting prac-
tices contributed to its eventual collapse when it declared bankruptcy in December 2001).
123. See DEMING, supra note 45, at 692.
124. See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, supra note 54, at 13; see also Weiss, supra note 
91, at 486–87.
125. See supra Section I.B.
126. See OECD Convention, supra note 24, art. 3, ¶ 3 (requiring countries to “take such 
measures as may be necessary to provide that the bribe and the proceeds of the bribery . . . or 
property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds, are subject to seizure and 
confiscation or that monetary sanctions of comparable effect are applicable”); UNCAC, supra
note 25, art. 31, ¶ 1 (granting countries the authority to “the greatest extent possible . . . to en-
able confiscation” of “[p]roceeds of crime” and “[p]roperty, equipment or other instrumentali-
ties used in or destined for use in offenses”).
Spring 2019] Promoting Predictabilty in Business 563
of profits that result from the illicit activity.127 Several countries specify that 
these “disgorgement-like” penalties are mandatory,128 while others provide 
for “extended confiscation,” which applies to the confiscation of assets or 
property that is “more probably . . . than not” the proceeds of criminal activ-
ity.129 These provisions would not be a problem but for their broad jurisdic-
tional reach and the potential for redundant usage across countries.
The OECD Convention in particular endorses a far-reaching definition 
of jurisdiction.130 An observer of the OECD Convention negotiations stated 
that its “interpretation is clear: even the slightest of connections is suffi-
cient” to justify an enforcement action.131 This enforcement is occurring 
primarily in countries with a large share of world exports. The most recent 
Transparency International report notes that OECD signatories with “mod-
erate” or “active” enforcement account for 30.8% of total world exports.132
With nearly one-third of world exports coming from countries enforcing the 
OECD Convention—and international anti-corruption enforcement increas-
ing133—numerous MNCs are at risk of carbon copy prosecutions and dis-
gorgement from multiple jurisdictions.
C. The Theoretical and Practical Problems of 
Multi-Jurisdictional Disgorgement
On both theoretical and practical grounds, disgorgement’s use as a rem-
edy in international anti-corruption efforts is questionable. Theoretical justi-
fications for punishment often fit a retributivist or utilitarian rationale.134 Yet 
neither theory provides satisfactory justification for overlapping liability or 
127. See, e.g., OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN AUSTRIA (2012), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Austriaphase
3reportEN.pdf (noting that Austria provides for the forfeiture of “assets that were obtained for 
or by the commission of an act punishable by law”). 
128. Weiss, supra note 91, at 492 n.111 (citing to reports that Slovenia, Italy, Poland, 
Norway, and Brazil require confiscation of a bribe’s proceeds after conviction).
129. OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN SWEDEN (2012), https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Swedenphase3
reportEN.pdf.
130. See Brewster, supra note 42, at 1664–65.
131. See Mark Pieth, Article 4: Jurisdiction, in THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY:
A COMMENTARY, 267, 276–77 (Mark Pieth et al. eds., 2013).
132. Transparency International is a leading global civil society organization fighting 
corruption. 
GILLIAN DELL & ANDREW MCDEVITT, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, EXPORTING CORRUPTION:
PROGRESS REPORT 2018: ASSESSING ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD CONVENTION ON 
COMBATTING FOREIGN BRIBERY 4 (2018).
133. See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, supra note 54, at 2.
134. For a discussion of the panoply of justifications for punishment, see JOHN KAPLAN 
ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 551–53 (8th ed. 2016); see also John D. 
Castiglione, Qualitative and Quantitative Proportionality: A Specific Critique of Retributiv-
ism, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 71, 77 (2010).
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multi-jurisdictional disgorgement. First, because disgorgement is not in-
tended as a punitive remedy, it cannot be justified under retributivism, 
which seeks to punish wrongdoers for the sake of punishment.135 Second, 
multi-jurisdictional disgorgement is inappropriate under utilitarianism. 
Utilitarianism sees punishment as intrinsically bad and argues that punish-
ment is only justified when it results in overall benefits to society.136 It is 
grounded in the principle of proportionality: a view that punishment must 
not be excessive relative to the crime for which it is inflicted.137
Proportionality is important because it underlies a country’s claim to le-
gitimacy and is the basis for a modern legal system.138 A country holds a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force within its territory.139 A country’s 
usage of power, however, is only legitimate if it exercises this force propor-
tionally.140 A perfectly proportional punishment in the disgorgement context 
would strip companies of the exact amount gained through their unlawful 
activity, thereby removing the incentive to engage in the behavior in the 
first place.141 However, overlapping liability means that multiple countries 
could seek disgorgement of the same ill-gotten gains, resulting in corpora-
tions paying out sums that far exceed their illicit profits.142 This renders 
135. IMMANUEL KANT, THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT (1790), reprinted in 42 GREAT BOOKS 
OF THE WESTERN WORLD: KANT 395, 447 (Robert Maynard Hutchins et al. eds., 1989) (stat-
ing that punishment ought to be “pronounced over all criminals proportionate to their internal 
wickedness;”) (emphasis in original); Don E. Scheid, Kant’s Retributivism, 93 ETHICS 262, 
263 (1983).
136. JEREMEY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION (1781), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 91–96 (John 
Bowring ed., 1995).
137. James T. McHugh, Utilitarianism, Punishment, and Ideal Proportionality in Penal 
Law: Punishment as an Intrinsic Evil, 10 J. BENTHAM STUDIES 1, 1 (2008).
138. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND 
THE LAW ON TRIAL 18 (1988) (“A legal system is possible only if the state enjoys a monopoly 
of force. When private individuals appeal to force and decide who shall enjoy the right to ‘life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,’ there can be no pretense of the rule of law.”).
139. See Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in THE VOCATION LECTURES 32, 33 (Da-
vid Owen & Tracy B. Strong eds., Rodney Livingstone trans., 2004).
140. Youngjae Lee, Why Proportionality Matters, U. PA. L. REV. 1835, 1839 (2012) 
(claiming that “the government cannot preserve its legitimacy as the sole rightful holder of the
power to punish unless it respects the restrictions on its use of force, including proportionali-
ty.”).
141. See Weiss, supra note 91, at 506.
142. While a deterrence rationale might be used to defend multi-jurisdictional disgorge-
ment, deterrence is “best served through a purely utilitarian theory of punishment,” Matthew 
Haist, Deterrence in a Sea of “Just Deserts”: Are Utilitarian Goals Achievable in a World of 
“Limiting Retributivism,” 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 789, 793 (2009), which values pun-
ishment proportionate to the crime. Weiss, supra note 91, at 506. Moreover, because multi-
jurisdictional disgorgement delivers disproportionate punishment, even when taking into ac-
count “a multiplier based on the likelihood of being caught,” it stills fails a utilitarian test and 
is therefore theoretically unjustifiable. Id.
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MNCs vulnerable to disproportionate punishment. Therefore, multi-
jurisdictional disgorgement fails a utilitarian test.
These theoretical concerns are exacerbated by practical difficulties of 
determining the benefit to an MNC from an unlawfully secured contract. 
U.S. case law supports calculating disgorgement as the net economic gain 
from unlawful activity.143 In securities trading, this is a relatively simple cal-
culation because it a value measurement between two points in time.144 The 
amount to be disgorged is the unjust enrichment of one party at the expense 
of the other.145 But in international bribery, it is difficult to know whether a 
firm would have received a contract but for the illicit payment. Indeed, dis-
gorgement calculations “resemble speculation, or, at best, rough esti-
mates.”146 Further, because these uncertainties are typically resolved against
defendants,147 these calculations weaken disgorgement’s theoretical founda-
tions148 and undermine disgorgement’s use as a proportional remedy.149 Im-
portantly, even if the net economic gain from an improper payment can be 
calculated, not all contracts result in profits for the party awarded the con-
tract. If a hypothetical party bribed its way to two contracts, one with a net 
economic gain and the other a net economic loss, would the latter be credit-
ed to the former? Unlikely.150
These theoretical and practical pitfalls are only exacerbated if multiple 
jurisdictions require disgorgement for the same offense. As it stands, there 
is no formal mechanism determining which jurisdictions may bring an en-
forcement action under the FCPA or the domestic legislation implemented
by countries in the wake of the OECD Convention and UNCAC. This 
leaves MNCs vulnerable to disproportionate and redundant punishment. Un-
til a formal mechanism transparently details the extent of a company’s lia-
bility, foreign direct investment in emerging economies will be slowed and 
international development will suffer.151
143. See Elaine Buckberg & Frederick C. Dunbar, Disgorgement: Punitive Demands 
and Remedial Offers, 63 BUS. LAW., Feb. 2008, at 347, 349.
144. Id. at 353.
145. Id.
146. Weiss, supra note 91, at 475.
147. James Tyler Kirk, Deranged Disgorgement, 8 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L.
131, 153 (2014) (citing U.S. case law demonstrating that the SEC is given the benefit of the 
doubt when calculating disgorgement).
148. Caprice L. Roberts, Supreme Disgorgement, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1413, 1437–38 (2016) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s approval of disgorgement as a deterrence mechanism in Kan-
sas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042 (2015)). 
149. Id. at 1437.
150. Thank you to Professor Timothy Dickinson for this thoughtful hypothetical. 
151. See supra nn. 99–106and accompanying text.
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III.  Solutions to Overlapping Liability
A formal mechanism that limited overlapping liability and multi-
jurisdictional disgorgement would increase predictability for MNCs. In-
creased predictability would benefit a given MNC because it would be on 
notice regarding “which sovereigns it may be subject to and to what degree 
they will cooperate.”152 This knowledge would enable MNCs to internalize 
their liability risks and make more accurate assessments of whether or not to 
invest.153 Section III.A describes the requisite features for a mechanism that 
would help limit overlapping liability and promote cooperation between ju-
risdictions. Section III.B explains why the first solution—a centralized 
mechanism in either the OECD Convention or UNCAC—will not adequate-
ly promote the needed level of proportionality or predictability. Section 
III.C explains why the second solution—a decentralized mechanism consist-
ing of a series of bilateral agreements—represents a more realistic path for-
ward.
A. The Formal Mechanism: Requisite Provisions
Commentators have expressed an interest in a formal mechanism to 
guard against duplicative enforcement actions, but they have been unable to 
agree on the basic provisions that such a mechanism should contain and the 
most appropriate framework for implementation.154 This Note contributes to 
this debate by proposing a theoretical framework that considers the current 
lack of proportionality155 and predictability156 that result from overlapping 
liability and multi-jurisdictional disgorgement. To mitigate these concerns, 
this Note proposes a mechanism containing the following provisions: (1) a 
presumption that the country with the strongest jurisdictional ties to the al-
legedly unlawful activity will commence the anti-corruption action, (2) a 
multi-jurisdictional prohibition against double jeopardy, and (3) a commit-
ment to seeking proportional punishment, including limiting disgorgement 
to the calculable amount of ill-gotten gains.
152. Weiss, supra note 91, at 501–02.
153. See SALACUSE, supra note 102, at 25; Bulovsky, supra note 103.
154. See Beasley, supra note 12, at 194–95 (arguing that an international standard defin-
ing liability, defenses, and sanctions for bribery would help militate against companies trying 
to find loopholes in countries’ domestic legislation); Weiss, supra note 91, at 514 (noting that 
a formal instrument would create more certainty for companies); Rachel Brewster, The Do-
mestic and International Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 15 U. CHI. J.
INT’L L. 84, 105 (2014) (stating that a clear standard for enforcement would help governments 
know which other countries are not adequately enforcing domestic anti-corruption legisla-
tion); Thomas J. Bussen, Midnight in the Garden of Ne Bis in Idem: The New Urgency for an 
International Enforcement Mechanism, 23 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 485, 510–11 (2015) 
(proposing a mechanism within the UN to centralize anti-corruption enforcement actions).
155. See Roberts, supra note 148, at 1437; Weiss, supra note 91passim.
156. See Spahn, supra note 11, at 2, 6; Sivachenko, supra note 93, at 415.
Spring 2019] Promoting Predictabilty in Business 567
First, a proportional and predictable mechanism must contain a deci-
sion-making process for determining which jurisdiction will take the lead on 
enforcement.157 Such a process would be fact-specific and could apply a pre-
sumption that the jurisdiction with the strongest territorial ties to the alleg-
edly unlawful activity would take the lead.158 The precise terms of what con-
stitutes the strongest jurisdictional ties would need to be negotiated. While 
vague terms could be applied subjectively, clearer terms would help pro-
mote predictability.159 Clearer terms would include a consideration of “the 
links between the state and the conduct, the links between the conduct and 
another state wishing to exercise jurisdiction, where the case might be more 
conveniently heard, and the interests of justice.”160 The presumption that the 
country with the strongest jurisdictional ties would lead the enforcement ac-
tion maps onto intuitions about legitimacy: extraterritoriality feels less 
fair.161 While there has been a promising trend toward greater international 
cooperation in the investigation of anti-corruption cases over the past sever-
al years,162 an important next step toward ensuring international buy-in and 
promoting predictability would be to create a presumption that jurisdiction 
follows territorial ties. Not only does extraterritorial enforcement risk dam-
aging the legitimacy of anti-corruption efforts, it can also hamper other 
countries’ efforts to strengthen their own anti-corruption programs.163 In 
light of these concerns, the mechanism should provide that the party with 
the strongest ties to the conduct in question will lead the enforcement ac-
tion.164
Second, the mechanism must prohibit double jeopardy.165 As exempli-
fied by TSKJ Consortium, MNCs may be subjected to multiple enforcement 
actions for the same conduct.166 This has a chilling effect on international 
157. See REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE, supra note 83, at 21–22, 25. Another important 
consideration is whose law should apply to the enforcement action. This inquiry is beyond the 
scope of this Note but warrants further attention in future work.
158. Id. at 24.
159. See id.
160. Id.
161. See Mateo J. de la Torre, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Imposing an Ameri-
can Definition of Corruption on Global Markets, 49 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 469, 477 (2016) (ar-
guing that stretching the bounds of jurisdiction undermines the legitimacy of enforcement ac-
tions under the FCPA).
162. See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, supra note 54, at 25–26.
163. See de la Torre, supra note 161, at 494 (arguing that foreign countries who have 
relied on the efforts of U.S. actions under the FCPA have been deprived of the incentive to 
develop and improve their own anti-corruption programs).
164. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE, supra note 83, at 25 (describing commonly em-
ployed discretionary doctrines permitting countries to refrain from exercising jurisdiction in 
favor of proceedings in another jurisdiction).
165. See Spahn, supra note 11, at 21 (calling for additional cooperation in investigations 
as well as respect for the principles of double jeopardy and ne bis in idem).
166. See, e.g., supra nn. 3–10 and accompanying text. 
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business,167 disincentivizes compliance and due diligence,168 and undermines 
growth in emerging markets.169 To increase the predictability of enforcement 
actions, the mechanism must prevent other countries from undertaking car-
bon copy prosecutions.170 A mechanism that prohibited double jeopardy and 
ne bis in idem would assuage concerns that an MNC might be subjected to 
an unpredictable level of liability.
While the double jeopardy bar would prevent over-enforcement, there 
are concerns that it would have two primary unintended consequences. First, 
a prohibition on double jeopardy might result in haphazard investigations.171
The concern is that, with unbridled discretion to pursue enforcement ac-
tions, prosecutors from multiple countries would engage in a race to the bot-
tom in a rush to obtain a payout.172 Others are concerned with corporate cap-
ture173—that is, when a home country pursues an action, thereby triggering 
the double jeopardy bar, but proceeds to collude with an MNC in a “sweet-
heart-deal” to bring only nominal charges.174 The latter concern is unlikely, 
however, because a criminal conviction in even one corruption case “trig-
gers the mandatory debarment sanctions adopted by the EU.”175 Regardless, 
it is worth watching for MNCs acting to take advantage of these sanction 
arbitrages.176
The third provision borrows from coordination efforts in international 
antitrust enforcement. Since the United States passed the International Anti-
trust Enforcement Assistance Act (the “IAEAA”) in 1994,177 U.S. agencies 
167. See Spalding, supra note 99, at 371–72 (noting that aggressive enforcement of the 
FCPA and concomitant liability on companies has resulted in reduced economic growth in 
countries where the conduct that triggered the enforcement action occurred); Tarun & 
Tomczak, supra note 15, at 206–07 (claiming that a large sanction “may create a disincentive 
for corporations to report voluntarily detected FCPA violations”). This Note argues that, if 
one enforcement action (for example, under the FCPA) has the potential to reduce investment 
in a country and disincentivize self-reporting detected crimes, then several levels of liability 
(that is, enforcement actions from multiple countries) will exacerbate these concerns. 
168. See Sivachenko, supra note 93, at 415.
169. See Ryznar & Korkor, supra note 99, at 418; Spalding, supra note 99, at 376.
170. Boutros & Funk, supra note 2, at 260.
171. See Bussen, supra note 154, at 509. 
172. Id. (commenting that the race to the finish line would undermine the rule of law and 
the overall credibility of anti-corruption efforts).
173. See Patrick X. Delaney, Transnational Corruption: Regulation Across Borders, 47 
VA. J. INT’L L. 413, 439 (2007) (defining corporate capture as when corporate interests “ef-
fectively hijack[] the regulatory process to their own ends”).
174. Spahn, supra note 11, at 43.
175. Id.
176. See Tomer Broude & Doron Teichman, Outsourcing and Insourcing Crime: The 
Political Economy of Globalized Criminal Activity, 62 VAND. L. REV. 795, 799 (2009).
177. International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-438, 
108 Stat. 4597 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C.). 
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are empowered to enter into bilateral agreements with other countries178 and 
cooperate directly with them by sharing business information uncovered in 
the course of antitrust investigations.179 These bilateral agreements help co-
ordinate enforcement and guard against redundant prosecutions.180 Within 
this system, countries decide which polity is the most appropriate jurisdic-
tion to enforce its national regulations.181 These antitrust agreements include 
cooperation provisions182 that are similar to those contained in mutual legal 
assistance treaties (“MLATs”) in anti-corruption enforcement.183 However, 
while MLATs require countries to support each other’s investigations,184 the 
bilateral agreements found in antitrust enforcement operate under the prin-
ciple of comity.185
Comity is a broad concept that refers to a country’s willingness to limit 
or forgo exercising jurisdiction, even when it may be adversely affected.186
U.S. courts have justified comity both as a means to respect foreign sover-
eignty187 and as a way to protect parties’ expectations in international com-
merce.188 The principle itself has “long been recognized as the most appro-
priate way for U.S. courts to resolve conflicts in private law between 
178. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding on Antitrust Cooperation Between the 
United States Department of Justice and the United States Federal Trade Commission on the 
One Hand, and The Russian Federation Anti-Monopoly Service, on the Other Hand (Nov. 10, 
2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2009/11/12/251836.pdf.
179. Edward T. Swaine, Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy, in
COOPERATION, COMITY, AND COMPETITION POLICY 3, 19 (Andrew T. Guzman ed., 2011).
180. Holtmeier, supra note 1, at 518.
181. See REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE, supra note 83, at 48.
182. See Olga Petrovsky, International Antitrust Agreement: Premature Proposal and 
Practical Solutions, 22 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 131, 134–35 (2009) (noting that the principles of 
(1) notification, (2) information exchange, (3) cooperation, and (4) consultation collectively 
require countries to notify each other of information that might warrant enforcement by the 
other, exchange information about the implicated MNCs, and provide assistance throughout a 
given enforcement action).
183. See MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES, https://www.mlat.info (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2019).
184. See T. Markus Funk, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and Letters Rogatory: A 
Guide for Judges, FED. JUD. CTR. INT’L LITIG. GUIDE (2014), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/
default/files/2017/MLAT-LR-Guide-Funk-FJC-2014.pdf (defining mutual legal assistance 
treaties as binding commitments between two countries to assist each other to obtain evidence 
to support investigations or prosecutions in the requesting country).
185. Holtmeier, supra note 1, at 518.
186. Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 5–6 (1991).
187. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
629 (1985) (commenting that the interests of international comity require respecting the deci-
sions of foreign and transnational tribunals, “even assuming that a contrary result would be 
forthcoming in a domestic context.”).
188. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516–17 (1974) (justifying 
comity on the grounds that “orderliness and predictability” are “essential to any international 
business transaction.”).
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juridical systems.”189 Comity has been relatively successful in antitrust en-
forcement: shortly after the United States passed the IAEAA, the United 
States and the European Union signed the 1998 Positive Comity Agreement 
between the United States and the European Union.190 For more than twenty 
years, this treaty has helped “reduce the costs associated with duplicative 
prosecution and thereby streamline international enforcement.”191 In addi-
tion, other treaties, such as the bilateral agreement between the United 
States and Japan,192 have helped militate against redundant prosecutions and 
the excessive extraterritorial application of either country’s laws.193
To minimize redundant prosecutions and assuage corporate concerns 
about overlapping liability, anti-corruption enforcement should adopt the 
principle of comity. In the anti-corruption context, a mechanism that incor-
porates comity would create a reciprocal and mutually reinforcing set of ex-
pectations through what is known as “mutual recognition”—a principle 
whereby countries hold each other responsible for their unilateral actions.194
Countries would be expected to follow agreed-upon principles and would be 
responsible to one another for upholding their commitments.195 For instance, 
the provision could limit the maximum amount to be disgorged to the 
amount of determinable gains that directly result from the conduct in ques-
tion. In so doing, these mutually reinforced expectations would contribute to 
189. Donald Earl Childress III, International Conflict of Laws and the New Conflicts 
Restatement, 27 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 361, 373 (2017) (citing Donald Earl Childress III, 
Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 U. CALIF. DAVIS 
L. REV. 11, 30 (2010)).
190. Agreement on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of 
Their Competition Laws, E.U.-U.S., June 4, 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 12958, 37 I.L.M. 1070. 
191. Holtmeier, supra note 1, at 519.
192. Agreement Concerning Cooperation on Anticompetitive Activities, Oct. 7, 
1999, Japan-U.S., https://www.justice.gov/atr/agreement-between-government-united-states-
america-and-government-japan-concerning-cooperation.
193. See Matthew Cooper, Comment, The Role of Positive Comity in U.S. Antitrust En-
forcement Against Japanese Firms: A Mixed Review, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 383, 395–97
(2001) (noting that, despite lingering concerns about the extraterritorial application of U.S. or 
Japanese laws in the antitrust context, a bilateral agreement would help settle jurisdictional 
conflicts).
194. See Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Re-
gimes: Governance Without Global Government, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 264 
(2005) (stating that mutual recognition, derived originally from EU law, refers to one coun-
try’s acceptance of another country’s regulatory system and that this acceptance “is reciprocal 
and simultaneous”).
195. Public international law operates according to norms that govern the conduct of 
countries and international organizations. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 101 (AM. LAW INST. 1986). For comity to be suc-
cessful, countries would need to exercise restraint in the extraterritorial or redundant applica-
tion of their anti-corruption legislation. This would need to emerge as a norm in the interna-
tional legal order.
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an international anti-corruption enforcement regime that is more predictable 
and better respects proportionality.196
Collectively, these three provisions would produce a more transparent, 
proportional, and predictable international anti-corruption regime. In turn, 
increased transparency and predictability should increase compliance as 
companies and regulators alike benefit from a more robust understanding of 
the risks involved in a given transaction or contract.197 Accordingly, the 
above are essential provisions for a formal mechanism, regardless of where 
they are codified.
B. Amending the OECD Convention or 
UNCAC Provides Insufficient Certainty
One solution for minimizing overlapping liability would be to amend 
the articles in the OECD Convention and UNCAC that cover jurisdiction198
and sanctions.199 This, at least theoretically, would be a more comprehensive 
means to implement the three provisions outlined above than creating new 
conventions or agreements involving a handful of countries.200 Implement-
ing a mechanism in the OECD Convention or UNCAC could be achieved in 
one of two ways. First, the conventions could rely on the doctrine of “func-
tional equivalence,”201 which empowers countries to implement the conven-
196. See McHugh, supra note 137, at 1.
197. See James R. Doty, Toward a Reg. FCPA: A Modest Proposal for Change in Ad-
ministering the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 BUS. LAW. 1233, 1248 (2007).
198. Article 4 of the OECD Convention addresses jurisdiction. Article 4(3) in particular 
implores countries to consult with one another to determine who has “the most appropriate 
jurisdiction for prosecution.” OECD Convention, supra note 24, art. 4. This, however, does 
not prevent multiple countries from bringing an enforcement action. See Brewster, supra note 
42, at 1665 (noting that the OECD Convention purposefully provided for a far-reaching defi-
nition of jurisdiction). Therefore, to militate against redundant prosecutions, the provisions 
related to jurisdiction should be placed in the OECD Convention as Article 4(5). As for 
UNCAC, Article 42 covers jurisdiction, making it the ideal location to prohibit redundant 
prosecutions. UNCAC, supra note 25, art. 42. Therefore, the jurisdictional provisions could 
be added to UNCAC as Article 42(7). 
199. Article 3 of the OECD Convention covers sanctions. See OECD Convention, supra
note 24, art. 3. Therefore, Article 3(5) would ensure that enforcement actions result in propor-
tional punishments. As for UNCAC, Article 30 addresses prosecution, adjudication, and sanc-
tions under the Convention. Article 30(1) in particular implores parties to take into account 
the “gravity” of an offense, making it an optimal location to include further language about 
disgorgement. UNCAC, supra note 25, art. 30, ¶ 1. Therefore, the proportionality require-
ments could be added as part of Article 30(1). 
200. See infra Sections III.B and III.C for a discussion of the trade-offs between placing 
the solution in a centralized or decentralized framework.
201. Functional equivalence is first noted in the Preamble to the OECD Convention, 
which “[r]ecognis[es] that achieving equivalence among the measures to be taken by the Par-
ties is an essential object and purpose of the Convention, which requires that the Convention 
be ratified without derogations affecting this equivalence.” OECD Convention, supra note 24,
pmbl. In UNCAC, functional equivalence is found in Articles 31 and 55, which call for coun-
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tions as they see fit—so long as they are applied in a way that achieves the 
conventions’ goals.202 Alternatively, the conventions could create a single, 
uniform standard to apply evenly across countries. But, for the reasons ex-
plained below, it is unlikely that either of these options would effectively 
implement the mechanism identified in Section III.A.
The doctrine of functional equivalence is unsatisfactory because it 
would subject MNCs to an unacceptable level of uncertainty. Functional 
equivalence reflects the notion that countries are different and that formal 
legislation might not fully capture the ways in which a country pursues anti-
corruption actions.203 Under a functional equivalence approach, there would 
be no harmonization across jurisdictions because functional equivalence 
prioritizes the ends of a country’s efforts to combat corruption rather than its 
means.204 While functional equivalence respects countries’ cultural practices 
and legal institutions as a whole, it inevitably results in incongruent stand-
ards across jurisdictions.205
While incongruent standards may not be problematic in their own right, 
when these standards are “concurrently and cumulatively applied to 
MNCs,” they produce an environment that is “disproportionately hostile to 
MNCs because it fails to recognize the legal uncertainty arising from opera-
tion in numerous spheres with different laws.”206 Simply, country-by-
country implementation would be “neither functional nor equivalent” be-
cause it would create dissimilar standards and leave MNCs vulnerable to an 
unpredictable anti-corruption enforcement regime.207 Therefore, the func-
tional equivalence approach fails to provide sufficient certainty to MNCs 
considering investing or operating in jurisdictions with a relatively higher 
risk of corruption.
On the other hand, changing the OECD Convention or UNCAC to im-
plement the mechanism as a single, uniform standard would likely prove in-
sufficient. The OECD Convention and UNCAC cover nearly every country 
in the world.208 Counterintuitively, however, this large number of countries 
creates difficulties for implementing the mechanism proposed by this Note: 
to secure sufficient buy-in from countries around the world, the mechanism 
would likely be watered down to account for countries’ idiosyncratic en-
tries to adopt measures “to the greatest extent possible within [their] domestic legal system.”
UNCAC, supra note 25, arts. 31, 55.
202. See Pieth, supra note 131, at 270.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See Beasley, supra note 12, at 201 (arguing that, in practice, functional equivalence 
has allowed for different laws in different jurisdictions).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 193.
208. See supra nn. 80–81 and accompanying text.
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forcement preferences and definitions of corruption.209 For example, 
UNCAC purposefully uses “vague terminology” to promote longevity in its 
application.210 However, in striving to reach as many countries as possible, 
its lack of “mandatory language” renders much of UNCAC “toothless.”211
Simply, as an “aspirational framework,” it would be difficult to achieve 
consensus for a mechanism that meaningfully promoted proportionality and 
predictability under UNCAC.212
The OECD Convention has fewer signatories than UNCAC, thereby 
slightly assuaging concerns about the difficulty in reaching consensus re-
garding final language. However, the OECD Convention lacks guidance on 
the enforcement efforts countries are expected to undertake.213 In other 
words, the OECD Convention allows countries to interpret their obligations 
under the Convention in a way that allows them to formally comply by only 
enacting domestic legislation while neglecting to fully enforce it.214 While a 
uniform standard is theoretically appealing, empirical data suggests that it 
would not be enforced. For instance, the OECD Convention covers forty-
four countries, accounting for approximately 65% of world exports and over 
75% of foreign direct investment outflows.215 However, only eleven of these 
forty-four countries engage in “active” or “moderate” enforcement of the 
Convention.216 In other words, thirty-three countries—three-quarters of 
OECD signatories—engage in “limited”217 or “little or no enforcement.”218
Ultimately, half of the Convention’s signatories “have failed to prosecute 
209. Cf. Ophelie Brunelle-Quraishi, Assessing the Relevancy and Efficacy of the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption: A Comparative Analysis, 2 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 101, 140 (2011) (“It seems that two fundamental principles of UNCAC, transparen-
cy and impartiality, were watered down during the negotiations of the monitoring mechanism 
in order to please the largest number of Member States.”).
210. Id. at 164.
211. Id. at 164–65.
212. Beasley, supra note 12, at 215.
213. Brewster, supra note 154, at 105.
214. Id.
215. See DELL & MCDEVITT, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 132, at 6.
216. The United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Switzerland, Norway, and 
Israel engage in “Active Enforcement,” while Australia, Sweden, Brazil, and Portugal engage 
in “Moderate Enforcement.” Id. at 4.
217. France, the Netherlands, Canada, Austria, Hungary, South Africa, Chile, Greece, 
Argentina, New Zealand, and Lithuania engage in “Limited Enforcement.” Id.
218. China, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, India, Spain, Mexico, Russia, 
Belgium, Ireland, Poland, Turkey, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Fin-
land, Colombia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Estonia engage in “Little or No Enforcement.” Id. 
China, Hong Kong, India, and Singapore are not parties to the OECD Convention but were 
included in the most recent Transparency International report because each country accounts 
for 2% or more of world exports. Costa Rica, Iceland, and Latvia are parties to the OECD 
Convention but could not be classified due to their low shares of world exports. Peru became 
a party to the Convention in July 2018, which is too recent for inclusion in this report.
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any foreign bribery case since they joined the Convention.”219 These coun-
tries’ inaction “violates their obligations under the Convention.”220 In light 
of this data, it appears unlikely that the proposed mechanism, even if its text 
was widely agreed-upon and placed in the OECD Convention or UNCAC, 
would actually result in enforcement.
C. Bilateral Agreements Represent the 
Most Realistic Path Forward
A decentralized solution—by way of a series of bilateral agreements be-
tween countries—is the most promising way to implement the mechanism 
proposed by this Note.221 Specifically, it represents the most realistic path 
forward for ameliorating the perverse incentives presented by the lack of 
proportionality and predictability in the current international anti-corruption 
enforcement regime.222 Ultimately, a series of bilateral agreements is prefer-
able because it would be more comprehensive in practice and would help 
minimize conflicts between countries, which would increase the legitimacy 
of international anti-corruption enforcement.
First, a decentralized series of bilateral agreements would be more 
comprehensive in practice than the OECD Convention or UNCAC because 
bilateral agreements are necessarily negotiated between a smaller number of 
countries than a centralized solution at the international level.223 For exam-
ple, the current state of OECD enforcement is limited,224 which is due in part 
to the ambiguity of its requirements.225 These ambiguities make it difficult 
for countries to enforce their own domestic obligations under the OECD and 
for other countries to discern when a country is engaging in under-
enforcement.226 The concern is that “[t]he less clear the obligation, the hard-
er it is for states to determine if there is a violation and what a proportionate 
219. FRITZ HEIMANN, ÁDÁM FÖLDES & SOPHIA COLES, TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
EXPORTING CORRUPTION: PROGRESS REPORT 2015: ASSESSING ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATTING FOREIGN BRIBERY 6 (2015).
220. Id.
221. See supra Section III.A.
222. See supra Section II.A.
223. While it is unlikely that every bilateral agreement will be identical, the mechanism 
proposed by this Note does not require perfect harmonization. If anything, the mechanism is 
benefitted by the potential “laboratory effects” of multiple bilateral agreements, whereby 
countries can experiment with the specific provisions in the agreements. Cf. Paul B. Stephan, 
The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J.
INT’L L. 743, 791 (1999) (emphasis in original) (explaining that individual nations would be 
more effectively able to specify the terms of their contractual relations relative to achieving an 
international consensus).
224. See DELL & MCDEVITT, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 132, at 4.
225. Brewster, supra note 154, at 101.
226. Id. at 100–01.
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response involves . . . .”227 Therefore, solutions that improve clarity with re-
spect to a given country’s obligation to enforce anti-corruption legislation 
should also improve predictability for MNCs.
Simply, bilateral agreements would be relatively more effective at in-
corporating countries’ nuanced cultures, economies, and societies,228 which 
would help create tailored—and less ambiguous—enforcement programs.229
Less ambiguous enforcement programs would benefit countries enforcing 
anti-corruption legislation and MNCs alike. With clearer laws, countries 
would be able to better monitor the enforcement of domestic law230 under
the provisions of the bilateral agreements and could hold each other recipro-
cally responsible for enforcement.231 This Note suggests that the jurisdiction 
with the strongest ties to the allegedly unlawful activity would be required 
to take the lead in enforcement.232 Countries’ ability to monitor one anoth-
er—combined with a clearer set of expectations about which country would 
lead the enforcement action—might help traditionally under-enforcing 
countries strengthen their own anti-corruption programs.233 This would be 
beneficial for the anti-corruption regime as a whole because it would make 
for a more comprehensive international anti-corruption regime.234 Further-
more, it would free up prosecutorial resources in countries that have typical-
ly enforced anti-corruption at a relatively high level.235 Clearer laws would 
also help MNCs better predict their liability and thus internalize the risk of 
investing in a given polity. This transparency would help MNCs decide 
whether to invest or operate in a given country and could result in an in-
crease in foreign direct investment in developing countries.236
Second, bilateral agreements are a preferable framework for the pro-
posed mechanism because they would help minimize conflict between 
countries and thereby promote the legitimacy of anti-corruption enforce-
ment. Commentators have noted that stretching claims to extraterritorial ju-
227. Id. at 94.
228. See de la Torre, supra note 161, at 494.
229. See Brewster, supra note 154, at 92, 104 (defining anti-corruption legislation and 
“market-engaging” and noting that “the standards for evaluating whether a state is abiding by 
a good faith effort to enforce its own market-engaging legislation are not well-defined.”).
230. See id. at 104 (“On a spectrum of transparent to opaque, market-engaging agree-
ments trend toward the opaque, making these agreements difficult to monitor.”).
231. See id. at 93–94 (“Reciprocity requires being able to observe whether another party 
is abiding by its agreement and tailoring the response to be proportionate to the defection.”).
232. See supra Section III.A.
233. See de la Torre, supra note 161, at 483 (“FCPA fines from foreign defendants re-
sulting from foreign conduct are amounts that could otherwise strengthen the capabilities of 
foreign prosecutors to regulate the same conduct.”).
234. See id. at 483–84.
235. Id. at 495.
236. See supra nn. 99–103 and accompanying text.
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risdiction could create a legitimacy crisis for legislation.237 Indeed, the extra-
territorial application of one country’s laws “across borders is an undeniable 
source of transnational tension and strife.”238 These concerns become even 
more pertinent when one considers that countries have different definitions 
and cultural understandings of what constitutes corruption.239 Further, in-
creased anti-corruption efforts across the globe240 make it more likely for a 
conflict to arise between countries over whether a given act constitutes an 
unlawful activity.241 Thus, proposals for international anti-corruption en-
forcement that would help reduce conflict between countries would also 
help increase the legitimacy of the global anti-corruption regime.
The mechanism proposed by this Note and international antitrust en-
forcement rely heavily on the principle of comity. In the international anti-
trust context, bilateral agreements that invoke comity have helped minimize 
jurisdictional over-reaching and thereby mitigated conflict between coun-
tries.242 For instance, international cooperation with respect to cartel en-
forcement has helped “resolve conflicts arising out of extraterritorial juris-
diction.”243 Not only has the incorporation of comity into bilateral 
agreements helped reduce conflicts in antitrust enforcement, but it has also 
helped increase the legitimacy of the system as a whole by guarding against 
redundant prosecutions, which promotes a more proportional enforcement 
environment. According to the International Bar Association’s Task Force 
on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, redundant prosecutions violate the due pro-
cess rights of the accused.244 The violation of due process undermines “the 
perceived legitimacy of the prosecution.”245 Therefore, to the extent that 
comity and bilateral agreements help guard against redundant prosecutions, 
they also help increase the legitimacy of the enforcement regime itself.
The proposed mechanism relies on comity and prohibits double jeop-
ardy, while bilateral agreements help establish clearer laws and facilitate ac-
countability. Together, comity incorporated into bilateral agreements should 
237. See, e.g., Marie T. Batz, Comment, A Comparative Analysis of United States and 
European Union Jurisdiction in Extraterritorial Antitrust Law & The Need for International 
Standards, 9 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 65, 88 (2007) (stating that the “possibility of global backlash ex-
ists, and will continue to exist, if the United States and the European Union continue to sys-
tematically assert extraterritorial jurisdiction in all international antitrust cases”).
238. Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmo-
ny, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 419, 433 (1999).
239. See Jan Wouters et al., The International Legal Framework Against Corruption: 
Achievements and Challenges, 14 MELB. J. INT’L L. 1, 45 (2014).
240. See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, supra note 54, at 42.
241. See Wouters et al., supra note 239, at 45.
242. See Holtmeier, supra note 1, at 518 (noting that comity and bilateral agreements 
have helped antitrust enforcement guard against redundant prosecutions).
243. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE, supra note 83, at 57.
244. See id. at 186–87.
245. Id. at 187.
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result in a more “fair and efficient prosecution of [MNCs].”246 Multiple are-
as of law—international securities regulation,247 international crime,248 and 
international antitrust249—already rely on comity. As such, it presents a 
promising foundation for international anti-corruption enforcement. And, if 
successful, these principles could be extended to cover MDB contracts to 
further militate against redundant sanctions.250 Much like proposals for 
MLAT reform, these agreements, if made publicly available and easily ac-
cessible, would provide a more transparent international business environ-
ment for MNCs than currently exists.251 At the very least, this would attenu-
ate critiques that international anti-corruption standards are a form of legal 
imperialism.252
This Note does not propose lessening standards in international anti-
corruption enforcement by allowing countries to create increased exceptions 
for corrupt behavior; rather, it aims to promote proportionality and predicta-
bility in international business and create a more legitimate enforcement 
system. To that end, it prioritizes the interests of legitimacy over perfect 
harmonization.253 To the extent that proportionality and predictability are 
values in the international anti-corruption enforcement regime, bilateral 
agreements would likely prove an efficacious path forward.
246. See id. at 73.
247. See id. at 26 (noting the usage of mutual recognition for securities regulation in the 
European Union to simplify regulatory requirements).
248. See Tomer Broude & Doron Teichman, Outsourcing and Insourcing Crime: The 
Political Economy of Globalized Criminal Activity, 62 VAND. L. REV. 795, 842–43 (2009) 
(observing that the United Nations Convention Against Organized Crime (“CATOC”) oper-
ates in part on the basis of mutual recognition to set minimum international crime control 
standards).
249. See Paul B. Stephan, Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of International 
Cooperation, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 173, 203 (2005) (detailing the use of cooperative ar-
rangements in international antitrust enforcement actions).
250. An analysis of how the mechanism would apply to MDBs is outside the scope of 
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Conclusion
What began with the FCPA in the 1970s has grown into a global anti-
corruption regime254 that has dramatically increased enforcement over the 
past decade.255 Increased enforcement has exposed MNCs to overlapping 
liability and carbon copy prosecutions—both of which violate double jeop-
ardy. These problems are particularly pronounced in the disgorgement con-
text because MNCs may be subject to disproportionate punishment for al-
legedly unlawful conduct that rests on shaky theoretical and practical 
grounds. Collectively, these problems create a chilling effect on foreign di-
rect investment,256 which has an especially pernicious effect on developing 
countries in need of foreign capital.257 Under the mechanism proposed by 
this Note, companies will still have to consider whether to voluntarily dis-
close cases of bribery identified within the MNC.258 However, with a better 
understanding of which country will likely lead an enforcement action—and 
with a prohibition on double jeopardy, meaning they will not be negatively 
affected in other jurisdictions259—MNCs will have a clearer understanding 
of their liability. In turn, MNCs will have a stronger incentive to invest in 
compliance programs and disclose suspected violations in the first place.260
The proposed mechanism, if vested in bilateral agreements, would help 
create a more transparent, proportional, and predictable set of expectations 
for countries enforcing anti-corruption legislation and MNCs making deci-
sions of whether or not to engage in business abroad.261 Ultimately, this 
could help create a more robust international business environment—one 
that balances the interests of MNCs and anti-corruption enforcement offi-
cials.
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